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Incorporating Uncertainty Into Medical Decision Making: An Approach to Unexpected Test Results

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: thebianchi{at}gmail.com.

	Abstract

The utility of diagnostic tests derives from the ability to translate the population concepts of sensitivity and specificity into information that will be useful for the individual patient: the predictive value of the result. As the array of available diagnostic testing broadens, there is a temptation to de-emphasize history and physical findings and defer to the objective rigor of technology. However, diagnostic test interpretation is not always straightforward. One significant barrier to routine use of probability-based test interpretation is the uncertainty inherent in pretest probability estimation, the critical first step of Bayesian reasoning. The context in which this uncertainty presents the greatest challenge is when test results oppose clinical judgment. It is this situation when decision support would be most helpful. The authors propose a simple graphical approach that incorporates uncertainty in pretest probability and has specific application to the interpretation of unexpected results. This method quantitatively demonstrates how uncertainty in disease probability may be amplified when test results are unexpected (opposing clinical judgment), even for tests with high sensitivity and specificity. The authors provide a simple nomogram for determining whether an unexpected test result suggests that one should "switch diagnostic sides." This graphical framework overcomes the limitation of pretest probability uncertainty in Bayesian analysis and guides decision making when it is most challenging: interpretation of unexpected test results. Key words: pretest probability; uncertainty; Bayes; unexpected; decision theory. (Med Decis Making XXXX;XX:xx–xx)

First published on September 23, 2008, doi:10.1177/0272989X08323620

Medical Decision Making 2009;29:116.

A more recent version of this article appeared on January 1, 2009


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