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Medical Decision Making
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Clinical Reasoning and Cognitive Processes

John C. Hershey, PhD

Jonathan Baron, PhD

Expected utility theory, and the Bayesian probability theory on which it is based, form the normative basis of most work in medical decision analysis. Recent work in the psychology of judgments and decisions indicates that people do not conform to the axioms of this theory and that these deviations occur in clinical reasoning as well as in the psychology laboratory. At issue is what to do now. The authors argue that the important next steps lie at the interface between descriptive, prescriptive, and normative accounts, all of which affect each other. They point to examples in which the simplest application of supposedly normative theory seems inappropriate, and suggest ways in which the tension between normative and de scriptive models may be resolved. Key words: decision analysis; expected utility theory; clinical reasoning; cognitive processes. (Med Decis Making 7:203-211, 1987)

Medical Decision Making, Vol. 7, No. 4, 203-211 (1987)
DOI: 10.1177/0272989X8700700402
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